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Risk,

and

Emily Hammond*
ABSTRACT
The 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster presented a familiar
scenario from a risk perception standpoint. It combined a classic
“dread risk” (radioactivity), a punctuating event (the disaster
itself), and resultant stigmatization (involving worldwide
repercussions for nuclear power). Some nuclear nations
curtailed nuclear power generation, and decades-old opposition
to nuclear power found a renaissance. In these circumstances,
risk theory predicts a regulatory knee-jerk response, potentially
resulting in inefficient overregulation. But it also suggests
procedural palliatives that conveniently overlap with
administrative law values, making room for the engagement of
the full spectrum of stakeholders. This Article sketches the U.S.
regulatory response to Fukushima. From a positive perspective,
this story provides a useful case study for understanding
administrative agencies’ responses to disasters and the
concomitant role of risk perception. But this story also invites
using an administrative law lens to take a fresh look at the
issues of retroactivity and stakeholder engagement. This Article
concludes by identifying insights as well as research needs for
both regulatory responses to disaster and classic administrative
law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The tragic 2011 Tohuku Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan
presented a familiar scenario from a risk perception standpoint. The
events combined a classic “dread risk” (radioactivity), a punctuating
event (the Fukushima nuclear disaster), and resultant stigmatization
(involving worldwide repercussions for nuclear power). 1 The
Fukushima disaster revived memories of the Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl disasters and provided a reminder of the global
interconnectedness of nuclear power. In response, some nations
curtailed nuclear power generation, and decades-old opposition to
nuclear power found a renaissance. 2 In the United States, Fukushima
coincided with increasing concerns about spent-fuel policy that
threatened to dampen recent initiatives aimed at a nuclear
resurgence.3
With much at stake for nuclear power, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) quickly appointed a task force to review its
regulations and make recommendations in light of lessons learned
from Fukushima. 4 The resulting Near-Term Task Force (NTTF)
Report concluded that continuing reactor operation would not “pose

* Associate Dean for Public Engagement and Professor of Law, The George
Washington University Law School. This work was prepared in connection with the
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law’s 2015 Symposium, This is Not a Drill:
Responding to International Disasters. I thank the symposium participants and editors,
including Lincoln Davies for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft, as well as
Shirley Qin, GWU Law 2016, for her helpful research assistance.
1.
See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCI. 280, 283–84 (1987) [hereinafter
Slovic, Perception of Risk]. For discussion of these concepts, see infra Part I.
2.
See Brian Walsh, Japan Mulls Nuclear Revival Not Even 3 Years After
Fukushima, TIME (Feb. 25, 2014), http://time.com/9684/japan-mulls-nuclear-revivalnot-even-3-years-after-fukushima/ [http://perma.cc/8V7Z-DFM8] (archived Sept. 4,
2015) (describing international reactions to Fukushima); see also Lincoln L. Davies,
Beyond Fukushima: Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and Energy Law, 2011 BYU L. REV.
1937, 1938 (2011) (“We flip switches all day long without wondering where our
electrons come from, and then there is a Chernobyl, or Three Mile Island, or
Fukushima, and anti-nuclear protestors take to the streets.”).
3.
See Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the
Marketplace, 68 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 25, 32),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2584619 [http://perma.cc/MDZ5-9UMK] (archived Sept. 5,
2015) (providing examples). But see In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(granting writ of mandamus and directing NRC to proceed with its consideration of
Department of Energy’s Yucca Mountain license application);; Emily Hammond
Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J.
1763, 1766 (2012) [hereinafter Deference Dilemma] (recounting Obama administration’s
withdrawal of support for Yucca Mountain).
4.
See
generally
U.S.
NUCLEAR
REGULATORY
COMM’N
[NRC],
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE
NEAR–T ERM TASK FORCE REVIEW OF INSIGHTS FROM THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI
ACCIDENT (July 12, 2011) [hereinafter NTTF REPORT].
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an imminent risk to public health and safety.” 5 However, it also made
a number of recommendations, many of which NRC has begun to
implement. Some of the recommendations and resulting regulatory
activity are detailed below. For now, the important point is that to
carry out the NTTF recommendations, NRC issued a series of orders
modifying existing nuclear power plant licenses.6
The
prospect
of
modifying
existing
licenses—termed
“backfitting”—raises a host of issues. First, backfitting is a form of
retroactivity, which is disfavored throughout American law. To be
sure, there are several types of retroactivity.7 For example, suppose
NRC were to adopt a rule requiring all existing operators to install
emergency back-up electricity generation equipment. If NRC also
imposed penalties for failing to have such equipment prior to the new
rule’s issuance, it would be imposing new sanctions on past conduct.
This type of retroactivity is particularly problematic. 8 But if NRC
merely required the equipment going forward, the rule would be only
“secondar[ily]” retroactive in that it would upset operators’
expectations by imposing new costs in connection with existing
licenses.9 Courts are far more worried about the first category than
the second. But both have the potential to upset expectations,
undermine reliance, and destabilize the economic assumptions under
which regulated entities operate.10
Second, backfitting is situated at the intersection of high-stakes
interests: costs to industry, safety for workers and the public, and
confidence in the nation’s nuclear agency. Yet it has received scant
treatment in the courts and scholarly literature.11 The procedures by
which backfitting is ordered, and the substantive analyses that
accompany such regulatory action, deserve a closer look. Nuclear

5.
Id. at vii.
6.
See infra Part II (detailing regulatory response to Fukushima).
7.
See William V. Luneburg, Retroactivity and Administrative Rulemaking,
1991 DUKE L.J. 106, 109–10; Russell Weaver, Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations:
An Analysis of Judicial Responses, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 167 n.1 (1986).
8.
See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (rejecting
retroactive rulemaking authority unless expressly conveyed by Congress).
9.
Id. at 219 (Scalia, J., concurring).
10.
Luneburg, supra note 7, at 110 (noting that variations on retroactivity
share characteristics including “surprise” and “destabilizing effects”).
11.
Only one set of judicial opinions directly examines backfitting. See Union of
Concerned Scientists v. NRC (Concerned Scientists II), 880 F.2d 552, 555-61 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (upholding revised backfitting rule following remand). A search of Westlaw’s JLR
database for NRC/p backfit! yields eight articles. For the most directly relevant to the
topic of this essay, see Peter Huber, The Old–New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA.
L. REV. 1025, 1063–64, 1064 n.180 (1983) (describing preferences for prospective risk
regulation over retrofitting, citing the backfitting example); Anthony Z. Roisman et al.,
Regulating Nuclear Power in the New Millennium (The Role of the Public), 26 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 317, 333-35 (2009) (arguing the NRC has relied on backfitting too
infrequently and criticizing one backfitting standard).
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energy is uniquely poised to offer insights for disaster response in
many different contexts that may call for post hoc regulatory
adjustments. Indeed, the field is in some sense an ideal laboratory: it
provides a closed system of regulation, 12 a unified industry, 13 a
discrete number of regulated units, 14 a comprehensive statutory
scheme, 15 and a relatively unchanged technology since its first
deployment.16
Yet all these attributes point to a third set of issues lurking
behind the backfitting model. During the 1970s and 1980s, nuclear
power construction was famously plagued by delays and cost
overruns.17 Some of these problems were caused by the need to make
safety upgrades throughout the three-part licensing process; others
were caused by litigation; still others related to the overall economy.18
Certainly Three Mile Island and Chernobyl raised serious safety
concerns during this same time period. In fact, no new reactors were

12.
The Atomic Energy Act places sole authority for nuclear safety with the
NRC and preempts state and local attempts at regulating that field. See Entergy
Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 428 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding
Vermont regulatory statutes were preempted by the Atomic Energy Act). But cf. Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 20815 (1983) (upholding California law that conditioned nuclear plant construction on
findings by the state commission and distinguishing other preemption cases).
13.
For example, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) provided a unified
response to Fukushima. See NEI, FUKUSHIMA RESPONSE, http://www.nei.org/IssuesPolicy/Safety-Security/Fukushima-Response (last visited Sept. 5, 2015) [http://perma.
cc/6GCC-LKFT] (archived Sept. 5, 2015).
14.
There are currently ninety-nine reactor units in operation in the United
States. See NRC, NUCLEAR REACTORS, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/power.html (last
updated February 18, 2015) [http://perma.cc/EV34-Z2J2] (archived Sept. 5, 2015).
15.
The primary scheme is embodied in the Atomic Energy Act [AEA], 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011–259 (2011).
16.
Next-generation reactors are still in the research and development phase.
A new design certification was issued for the AP1000 reactor design in 2011, which will
be installed at the Vogtle Units in Georgia. See Design Certification Rule for the
AP1000 Design, 10 C.F.R. pt. 52, app. D. To be sure, these features of the nuclear field
also make it exceptional, which raises the possibility that drawing conclusions
generalizable to other fields could be problematic. For purposes of this Article,
however, I argue that the features unique to nuclear can also amplify various
regulatory issues, making them easier to identify and thereby promoting their further
study in other fields.
17.
See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes
in Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1984).
18.
For further discussion, see Hammond & Spence, supra note 3, at Part II;
JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS & THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 401–02 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 4th ed. 2015). An influential study of
the economics of nuclear power by the Massachusetts Institute for Technology (MIT)
considered many such factors. See MIT, The Future of Nuclear Power: An
Interdisciplinary MIT Study 38 (2003), http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/
nuclearpower-full.pdf [http://perma.cc/2EBV-X6WB] (archived Sept. 5, 2015); MIT,
Update of the MIT 2003 Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study
(2009),
http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-update2009.pdf
[http://
perma.cc/V8V2-TPU3] (archived Sept. 5, 2015).

completed after Chernobyl, save Tennessee Valley Authority’s Watts
Bar 1, which came online in 1996 but had been ordered in 1970.19
Despite the many concerns about nuclear power, it fills an
important need for electricity reliability by providing steady baseload
power, comprising 20 percent of U.S. electricity generation. Its
lifecycle carbon emissions are comparable to hydro and wind power,
making it an important player in climate change policy. 20 And it
emits none of the criteria pollutants and toxics that plague its
baseload competitor, coal.21 Of all the electricity fuels, nuclear power
most comprehensively internalizes negative externalities.22 But this
puts it at a competitive disadvantage in the wholesale markets—
particularly relative to coal and natural gas-fired generation—and
several plants have announced closures and plans not to renew their
licenses. 23 The industry argues that unless there are significant
market reforms, nuclear power plants will not be economically
viable.24 In other words, the future of nuclear power is uncertain, and
the industry’s ability to respond to newly identified safety needs
while operating economically is only becoming more urgent. 25

19.
20.

EISEN, supra note 18, at 402.
See, e.g., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., DEP’T OF ENERGY, LIFECYCLE
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRICITY GENERATION (2012), http://
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/57187.pdf [http://perma.cc/GB4B-5LPC] (archived Sept. 5,
2015). EPA envisions a role for nuclear power in the Clean Power Plan. See, e.g.,
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830, 34934 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (permitting new nuclear and capacity uprates as eligible for use in
adjusting CO2 emission rates).
21.
See Hammond & Spence, supra note 3, at 17 (describing how coal
extraction and emissions generate health and safety concerns, as well as water and air
pollution). See generally Pushker A. Kharecha & James E. Hansen, Prevented Mortality
and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Historical and Projected Nuclear Power, 47
ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4889 (2013) (modeling deaths prevented by use of nuclear power
rather than coal).
22.
See Hammond & Spence, supra note 3, at Part II.A (providing details and
comparisons to other fuels).
23.
See Matthew Wald, Vermont Yankee Plant to Close Next Year as the
Nuclear
Industry
Retrenches,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
27,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/
science/entergy-announces-closing-of-vermontnuclear-plant.html?_r=0 [http://perma. cc/7WYD-6677] (archived Sept. 5, 2015)
(describing planned retirement of Vermont Yankee and the “rapid decline” of the
nuclear industry).
24.
See News Release, Nuclear Energy Inst., NEI Warns Wall Street Analysts
of Flawed Electricity Markets (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.nei.org/News-Media/MediaRoom/News-Releases/NEI-Warns-Wall-Street-Analysts-of-Flawed-Electrici
[http://perma.cc/QM4E-YAPT] (archived Sept. 5, 2015).
25.
The policy issues related to spent nuclear fuel are likewise in urgent need
of attention. See Deference Dilemma, supra note 3, at 1783–90 (describing the history of
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act); see also EISEN, supra note 18, at 437–53 (describing
legal and policy developments through fall 2014).

These many issues are beyond the scope of a single essay. 26 My
modest goals here are twofold. First, I document NRC’s application of
the backfit rule as a response to Fukushima, drawing from the risk
perception literature to shed light on this regulatory approach.
Second, I examine the backfit rule through an administrative law
lens, focusing on retroactivity and the “administrative law values of
participation, deliberation, and transparency.” 27 The role of these
principles is of particular importance in a field where safety is
paramount, risk perceptions run high, and disasters can never be
fully predicted. And accounting for administrative law principles
sheds light on how other regulatory regimes might approach hazard
mitigation and disaster response in light of lessons learned.28
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets the stage by
providing a brief overview of the risk perception mechanisms at work
in nuclear power, linking those mechanisms to nuclear power
regulation, and describing the regulatory structure for backfitting.
Part II details the regulatory response to Fukushima, including the
use of the backfitting rule to date. Part III takes up the
administrative law concerns that backfitting raises and explores how
the retroactivity principles fare in this particular regulatory context.
Part IV identifies links between broad statutory discretion, highly
detailed regulatory regimes, and deferential judicial oversight that
can inform the rationality of agency behavior in the wake of disasters.
II. RISK PERCEPTION AND NUCLEAR RISK REGULATION
Basic risk perception principles aid in understanding the
importance of the nuclear regulatory scheme to public acceptance of
nuclear power. First, a distinction is helpful. The term “risk” can refer
to risk assessment, risk perception, and/or risk management. Much of
the nuclear regulatory scheme implements risk assessment methods,
which attempt to measure the cumulative likelihood and magnitude
of various hazards. 29 The assessments of risk are used to develop

26.
For a more detailed discussion of the economics of nuclear power, see
generally Hammond & Spence, supra note 3.
27.
See Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for
Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
313, 316–17 (2013) (enumerating values and collecting sources).
28.
See also Jacqueline L. Weaver, Offshore Safety in the Wake of the Macondo
Disaster: The Role of the Regulator, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 379 (2014) (documenting
massive regulatory shifts following BP-Deepwater Horizon oil spill).
29.
See Stanley Kaplan & B. John Garrick, On the Quantitative Definition of
Risk, 1 RISK ANALYSIS 11, 12–17 (1981) (setting forth a quantitative definition of risk);
see also Elisabeth Paté-Cornell, Risk and Uncertainty Analysis in Government Safety
Decisions, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 633, 635–36 (2002) (providing examples of probabilistic
risk analysis).

mitigation strategies, which attempt to reduce the likelihood of a
hazard, its magnitude, or both. 30 Part II below provides details on
how these concepts were implemented post-Fukushima. The ways
people perceive risk, however, relate to both the extent of any
regulatory response, and the public’s acceptance of such response.
This Part provides a brief overview of just a few of the risk perception
concepts that relate to Fukushima and nuclear power.
A. Risk Perception and Nuclear Power
Decades ago, pioneers of risk perception Amos Tversky and
Daniel Kahneman observed that humans perceive risk in ways that
deviate from mathematical predictions.31 Indeed, due at least in part
to their perceptions, humans seldom behave as rational economic
actors.32 It so happened that risk perception research came of age at
the same time as atomic energy. As a result, many of the pioneering
studies of risk perception involved nuclear power.33
One such line of research resulted in the theory of the
psychometric paradigm, 34 which categorizes risks according to how
dreaded35 and how familiar36 they are. Risks that are high-dread and
low-familiarity are perceived to be the worst, and include nuclear
power, nuclear waste disposal, and uranium mining. 37 People are
more likely to desire strict regulation for these types of risks. 38

30.
See, e.g., NRC, MITIGATION OF BEYOND–DESIGN–BASIS EVENTS 3,
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard/emergencyprocedures.html [http://perma.cc/QN8Q-JXM5] (archived Sept. 21, 2015) (collecting
sources).
31.
See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263, 265 (1979) [hereinafter Prospect
Theory]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1130-31 (1974).
32.
See generally Prospect Theory, supra note 31.
33.
See, e.g., Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Modeling Stigma: An Empirical Analysis
of Nuclear Images of Nevada, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA 107, 128–29 (2001); Paul
Slovic et al., Perceived Risk, Stigma, and Potential Economic Impacts of a High-Level
Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada, 11 RISK ANALYSIS 683, (1991) [hereinafter Slovic,
Perceived Risk]. See generally Stanley Rothman & S. Robert Lichter, Elite Ideology and
Risk Perception in Nuclear Energy Policy, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 383 (1987) (testing
various hypotheses to account for public distrust of nuclear power).
34.
See Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note 1, at 281.
35.
Dread is “catastrophic, hard to prevent, fatal, inequitable, threatening to
future generations, not easily reduced, increasing, involuntary and [personally]
threatening . . . .” Paul Slovic et al., Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in
SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT: HOW SAFE IS ENOUGH? 181, 199 (Richard C. Schwing &
Walter A. Albers, Jr. eds., 1980) [hereinafter Slovic, Facts and Fears 1980].
36.
Familiarity relates to a risk’s “observability, knowledge, immediacy of
consequences, and familiarity.” Id.
37.
Id. at 203–04 tbl.8. Examples of low-dread, high-familiarity risks include
bicycles, chainsaws, and trampolines. Id.
38.
Id. at 206.

Moreover, high-dread risks are highly susceptible to affect heuristics;
that is, given inputs suggesting a high risk (like Fukushima), people
will infer that the benefit of a particular technology (like nuclear
power) is low. 39 Punctuating events, like Three Mile Island,
Chernobyl, and Fukushima, reinforce these notions and contribute to
even deeper distrust of such technologies.40
The implications of such perceptions of nuclear power are many;
with respect to responses to Fukushima in particular, consider the
following statement of Paul Slovic: “[B]eliefs about the catastrophic
nature of nuclear power are a major determinant of public opposition
to that technology. This is not a comforting conclusion because the
rarity of catastrophic events makes it extremely difficult to resolve
disagreements by recourse to empirical evidence.” 41 And as Cass
Sunstein comments, “Both private and public institutions will
overreact” in the face of fear.42 In other words, it is very likely that
incidents such as Fukushima will lead to additional regulatory
obligations that may well be inefficient.
The great difficulty, of course, is determining whether such
inefficiency exists. Professor Sunstein and others have argued that
cost-benefit analysis should be at least part of the guard against
overregulation.43 But as many other scholars have shown, cost-benefit
analysis is subject to numerous deficiencies of its own.44 Moreover, as
the Slovic quote above indicates, it is extremely difficult to attach
analytical numbers to catastrophic events that by definition almost

39.
Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts
about Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311, 315 (2004)
[hereinafter Slovic, Risk as Analysis].
40.
See Paul Slovic et al., Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in
THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 137, 150–51 (2000) [hereinafter Slovic, Facts and Fears 2000]
(describing how accidents that signal a breakdown in safety-control systems may
“greatly enhance perceived risk and trigger strong corrective action”);; see also Roger E.
Kasperson et al., Stigma and the Social Amplification of Risk: Toward a Framework of
Analysis, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA 9, 27 (2001).
41.
Slovic, Risk as Analysis, supra note 39, at 149. But see Dan M. Kahan et
al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RESEARCH 147, 175–79 (2011)
(demonstrating, using cultural cognition theory, that risk perceptions are unlikely to
change when people are confronted with facts contrary to their cultural worldviews).
42.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
206 (2005).
43.
Id. at 129; see STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 21–29
(1993). Professor Sunstein is also a leading advocate of libertarian paternalism, which
is “an approach that preserves freedom of choice but that encourages both private and
public institutions to steer people in directions that will promote their own welfare.”
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1201 (2003) (describing and defending libertarian
paternalism).
44.
See, e.g., Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for
Liberals, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191, 192, 192 n.7 (2004) (raising normative issues and
collecting sources).

never happen. And there is another important consideration flowing
from this very brief overview of risk perception and nuclear power:
given the deep objections many have against nuclear power, it seems
problematic—even illegitimate—to say that such objections should be
dismissed out of hand.45
This core issue for legitimacy lies at the intersection of procedure
and substance, and is at the heart of the U.S. response to Fukushima.
If it is paternalistic to snub deeply felt concerns about nuclear safety
by attempting to erase them with cost-benefit analysis, and it is
counter to the efficiency imperative of regulation to regulate far
beyond what is necessary, one is left wondering how to respond to a
disaster in a way that is both fair and efficient. In some sense, this
question reflects a longstanding conundrum of administrative law
generally: how best to reconcile the need for efficient government
with the need for participation, deliberation, and transparency. 46
Indeed, the issue is even more salient for nuclear disasters, where
protection of public health and safety is paramount.47
It is of great interest, then, that the risk perception literature
itself suggests process-oriented palliatives. Identity affirmation,
pluralistic advocacy, and narrative framing are all variables that hold
potential for increasing individuals’ likelihood of considering
information more open-mindedly.48 These concepts map neatly onto
procedural justice considerations—voice, treatment with respect,
trustworthiness, and neutrality—which in turn dovetail with
administrative-law values.49 In a field as perception-prone as nuclear
power, this understanding offers a further utility for administrative
law as both a critical feature of, and a metric for, legitimacy.

45.
Democratic legitimacy, a mainstay of administrative law theory, assumes
that agencies should attempt to achieve the results that the average voter would seek
given the opportunity. See David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for
the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 99–100 (2000) (devising public choice
rationale supporting agencies’ democratic legitimacy). Procedural legitimacy, also a
core component of administrative doctrine, requires, among other things, opportunities
for voice and treatment with respect. Hammond & Markell, supra note 27, at 323.
46.
See Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure,
78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 279 (1978) (noting the need to balance these considerations).
47.
I assume that the nuclear industry, agency, and the public are aligned
generally with this view. Of course, they may disagree considerably as to the best way
to effectuate this goal. Furthermore, the agency and industry are likely aligned in
recognizing the risks to the industry itself that are posed by nuclear disasters. Neither
institution, presumably, would want all nuclear plants to halt operation. See Davies,
supra note 2, at 1985–89. The public, of course, is divided on this issue. See Rebecca
Riffkin, U.S. Support for Nuclear Energy at 51%, GALLUP.COM, (Mar. 30, 2015),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/182180/support-nuclear-energy.aspx
[http://perma.cc/UM82-WFZ8] (archived Sept. 6, 2015) (showing historical trends).
48.
Kahan, supra note 41, at 33.
49.
See Hammond & Markell, supra note 27, at 322–26.

B. The Nuclear Regulatory Scheme and the Backfitting Rule
With these principles in mind, consider the nuclear regulatory
regime and the backfitting rule—one of NRC’s most powerful tools for
responding to disasters.50 The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) is “virtually
unique” in the extent to which the statute lodges broad discretion
with the agency.51 With respect to developing licensing requirements,
NRC is authorized to require “such . . . information” as it “may, by
rule or regulation, deem necessary” in order to determine whether the
nuclear facility’s technical specifications “will provide adequate
protection to the health and safety of the public.” 52 When NRC sets
adequate protection standards, it may not consider the role of cost,
but it can consider other factors like the nature of the risks
involved.53 Even so, adequate protection does not require zero risk;
rather, it necessitates “reasonable assurance that a nuclear reactor
could be safely operated.”54 NRC may also impose additional safety
measures beyond adequate protection, and in doing so is authorized—
and does—consider the costs and benefits of such measures.55
Nuclear power plants must comply with NRC’s defense-in-depth
philosophy, which relies on a multilayered system of fail-safes and
backup planning to employ both active and passive protections in the
event that something goes wrong. Moreover, plants must be prepared
for “design-basis events”—anticipated operational events as well as
accidents, for which mitigation technology and strategies must be
deployed.56 The design-basis approach is informally equated with the
legal requirement of “adequate protection.”57 By comparison, beyond-

50.
There are several types of backfits. This Article is concerned with those
needed to ensure adequate protection and those providing safety enhancements. See 10
C.F.R. § 50.109 (1986).
51.
Siegel v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 400 F.2d 778, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1968);; see
also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NRC, 598 F.2d 759, 771 (3d Cir. 1979).
52.
42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2015).
53.
Pub. Citizen v. NRC, 573 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 2009); see Union of
Concerned Scientists v. NRC (Concerned Scientists I), 824 F.2d 108, 114–18 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (providing discussion). Thus, the adequate protection standard is distinguishable
from many other statutory mandates involving risk regulation. See, e.g., Entergy Corp.
v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 223 (2009) (upholding EPA’s consideration of cost for
cooling water intake structures under Clean Water Act); cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 469–70, 471 (2001) (finding no consideration of costs in developing
NAAQS, but identifying other Clean Air Act provisions expressly contemplating cost).
54.
Carstens v. NRC, 742 F.2d 1546, 1551 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Nader v.
Ray, 363 F. Supp. 946, 954 (D.D.C. 1973) (rejecting “complete,” “entire,” or “perfect”
assurance of safety as the standard for issuing facility operating licenses).
55.
Pub. Citizen, 573 F.3d at 918–19.
56.
This concept has been employed since the licensing of some of the earliest
reactors in the 1960s and 1970s. NTTF Report, supra note 4, at 15. The current design
certification approach to licensing (see 10 C.F.R. § 52 (2015)) takes a probabilistic risk
assessment approach. See id. at 17 (describing distinction).
57.
Id. at 15.

design-basis events are informally equated with safety
enhancements, that is, requirements beyond adequate protection that
would be mandated only if their benefits outweighed their costs. 58
The backfitting process maps onto this framework in the
following ways. First, backfitting is defined as “the modification of or
addition to systems, structures, components, or design of a
facility; . . . which may result from a new or amended provision in the
Commission’s regulations or the imposition of a regulatory staff
position interpreting the Commission’s regulations that is either new
or different from a previously applicable staff position.” 59 Relevant
here, NRC shall impose backfitting requirements on existing
licensees without regard to cost if “necessary to ensure that the
facility provides adequate protection.”60 If the agency issues such a
backfitting order, it must provide “appropriate documented
evaluation,” including the objectives of, and reasons for, the
modification. 61 Additional safety measures may be ordered through
the backfitting procedure if the NRC determines that there will be a
“substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and
safety” and that the costs are justified by the increased protection.62
The applicable regulations provide a list of factors to consider. 63
The history of NRC’s approach to backfitting provides insights
into its modern operation. The original rule, promulgated in 1970,
attracted criticism from nuclear watchdogs for its failure to establish
a systematic method of assessing needed upgrades, particularly in the
wake of the Three Mile Island accident.64 On the other hand, industry
critics charged that NRC implemented the rule haphazardly,
resulting in billions of dollars of costs to consumers and contributing
to the legendary cost overruns of nuclear construction in the 1970s
and early 1980s.65 NRC attempted to address this concern in a 1985
revision to the rule, a major component of which required that the
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59.
50 C.F.R. § 50.109 (2015).
60.
50 C.F.R. § 50.109(a)(4)(ii); see also § 50.109(a)(5) (“The Commission shall
always require the backfitting of a facility if it determines that such regulatory action
is necessary to ensure . . . adequate protection”). This provision is framed as an
exemption from a backfit analysis. Actions to ensure compliance with existing
regulations are also exempt from a backfit analysis. § 50.109(a)(4).
61.
50 C.F.R. §§ 50.109(a)(4), (6).
62.
50 C.F.R. § 50.109(a)(3).
63.
50 C.F.R. § 50.109(c).
64.
Union of Concerned Scientists. v. NRC (Concerned Scientists I), 824 F.2d
108, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
65.
Id. (collecting sources); see also Dean C. Dunlavey, Government Regulation
of Atomic Industry, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 295, 331 (1957) (providing comprehensive,
contemporaneous review of AEA of 1954, and noting early industry concerns about
costliness of backfitting orders).

benefits of a backfit must justify the costs.66 The D.C. Circuit vacated
the rule, 67 and on remand NRC made clear that the adequate
protection standard would never consider costs; however, additional
safety measures not needed for adequate protection would be subject
to a cost-benefit analysis.68 For those additional safety measures, the
agency must determine “that there is a substantial increase in the
overall protection of the public health and safety or the common
defense and security to be derived from the backfit and that the direct
and indirect costs of implementation for that facility are justified in
view of this increased protection.”69
NRC has issued a guidance document further explaining the
backfitting process and instructing staff on how to implement the
backfit rule.70 The document dedicates considerable attention to when
a backfit analysis is needed, perhaps reflecting the difficulties posed
by a standard—adequate protection—that lacks a set definition.
Indeed, commenters to the backfit rule reflected this concern, some of
which worried that every improvement would be subject to costbenefit analysis, and others of which worried that no improvements
would be so analyzed.71
Given these competing concerns, one might wonder what
procedural protections are available. Regulated entities have the
ability to challenge such orders within twenty days. 72 Persons who
are not licensees must make a specific showing why their interests
are adversely affected, addressing criteria set forth in 10 C.F.R. §
2.309(d). This code provision is directed generally to hearing requests,
petitions to intervene, and standing requirements, the last of which is
the subject of subsection (d). To request to intervene, the requestor

66.
See 10 C.F.R. § 50.109(a)(3); Concerned Scientists I, 824 F.2d at 111
(reprinting and describing operative language).
67.
Concerned Scientists I, 824 F.2d at 552.
68.
See Union of Concerned Scientists. v. NRC (Concerned Scientists II), 880
F.2d 552, 555–56 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (describing revisions on remand). This case arose in
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interpretations. Concerned Scientists I, 824 F.2d at 113. That view, of course, has not
prevailed. Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing At All: The
Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 67–73 (2013). However, this
meant that the Concerned Scientists I court failed to analyze NRC’s interpretation
under Chevron principles. Concerned Scientists I, 824 F.2d at 113.
69.
10 C.F.R. § 50.109(a)(3).
70.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS AND
EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA, BACKFITTING GUIDELINES NUREG-1409 (July,
1990), http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0322/ML032230247.pdf [http:// perma.cc/T8W3BVDK] (archived Sept.1, 2015).
71.
See Final Rule, Revision of Backfitting Process for Power Reactors, 53 Fed.
Reg. 20,603, 20,605 (1988) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 50) (describing opposite concerns of
Union of Concerned Scientists and industry group).
72.
10 C.F.R. § 2.202 (2015). Interested governmental entities may participate
in proceedings pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(c) (2015).

must show a statutory right to be made a party or describe a
property, financial, or other interest. 73 Even if the minimal
requirements for standing are met, however, a prospective intervener
must raise a valid contention.74 Contentions must materially relate to
the scope of the proceeding.75 Because these proceedings are highly
technical, these requirements for intervention present a high barrier
to entry. In sum, regulated entities have much greater procedural
access to argue that a backfit order goes too far than do interested
parties who might argue that a backfit order is inadequate. As
exemplified by the regulatory response to Fukushima, this tilt
appears pervasive.
III. THE REGULATORY RESPONSE TO FUKUSHIMA
Following Fukushima, NRC convened a Near-Term Task Force
(NTTF) to identify lessons learned, conduct a comprehensive review
of NRC regulations, and make recommendations. In particular, the
Task Force focused on risks posed by natural phenomena, how NRC
has historically protected against such risks, and how NRC has
handled events beyond the design basis of existing plants. 76 As
mentioned previously, the NTTF’s July 12, 2011 report concluded
that continuing to both operate existing plants and engage in
licensing activities would not “pose an imminent risk to public health
and safety.”77 However, it also recommended an overhaul of NRC’s
regulatory framework to provide a more systematic and
comprehensive set of rules for ensuring adequate protection. 78
Further, it recommended actions directed at (1) reevaluation of
seismic and flooding risks; (2) enhancing mitigation capabilities,
particularly for station blackouts, venting, spent fuel pool
instrumentation, and emergency response capabilities; (3) emergency
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10 C.F.R. § 309(d) (2015).
74.
See Conn. Coal. Against Millstone v. NRC, 114 Fed. Appx. 36, 38–39 (2d
Cir. 2004) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that NRC improperly denied motion to
intervene, where petitioner had “shown little knowledge of the technical issues
pertaining to the proposed license amendment”) (quoting In re Dominion Nuclear
Conn., 58 N.R.C. 207, 219 (2003)).
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See Blue Ridge Envtl. Def. League v. NRC, 716 F.3d 183, 197, 199 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (rejecting petitioners’ challenge to NRC’s denial of contentions regarding
Vogtle licensing where, inter alia, contentions provided no explanations of how NTTF
Report raised previously unaddressed issues, and where contentions lacked specific
links between Fukushima and Vogtle site).
76.
See generally NTTF Report, supra note 4.
77.
Id. at vii.
78.
Id. at 15–23.

preparedness; and (4) improved oversight of licensee safety
performance.79
Following the NTTF Report, NRC staff had “interactions with
stakeholders” 80 and developed two reports, the first recommending
actions to be taken without delay, 81 and the second recommending
prioritization of such actions. 82 Although NRC agreed with the
NTTF’s determination that there was no imminent risk, 83 it
determined
that
adequate
protection
required
additional
requirements for licensees and construction permit holders. 84
The agency thus issued a series of backfit orders to modify
existing licenses with respect to mitigation strategies, 85 venting
systems for certain containment designs, 86 and spent fuel pool
instrumentation. 87 The activity associated with venting systems
illustrates the nuances that may arise. The original Venting Order,
EA-12-050 (Mar. 12, 2012), required licensees with Mark I or Mark II
containments88 to install reliable hardened venting systems to ensure
adequate protection. 89 Venting Order I emphasized that at
Fukushima, operators’ inability to successfully operate the
containment venting system early during the event made it more
difficult to cool the reactor core, leading to “extensive core damage,
high radiation levels, hydrogen production, and containment
failure.”90 After noting substantial variance among hardened vents in
the United States, the order stated simply that reliable hardened
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See, e.g., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances (N.R.C), Order
Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents, EA-12-050,
at 3 (Mar. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Venting Order I].
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RECOMMENDED ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN WITHOUT DELAY FROM THE NEAR-TERM TASK
FORCE REPORT (2011).
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Id. at 2.
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See id. at 4.
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Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, EA-12-049 (Mar. 12, 2012).
86 See generally Venting Order I, supra note 80.
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See generally U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances (N.R.C),
Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation,
EA-12-051 (Mar. 12, 2012). Numerous other regulatory activities are detailed at NRC,
Japan Lessons Learned, NRC (last updated Jan. 2015), http://www.nrc.gov/
reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard.html [http://perma.cc/AW5N-DQX7]
(archived Sept. 21, 2015).
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Venting Order I, supra note 80, at 3.
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Id. at 4.
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venting systems are needed to ensure adequate protection. 91 By
contrast, the order explained that the issue whether to also require
filtered vents—which would address concerns about the release of
radioactive materials if venting systems were used during an
accident—required resolution of “policy issues” that would be further
evaluated by staff.92
Later that same year, NRC staff presented an analysis of the
costs and benefits associated with requiring upgradable hardened
vents as well as hardened vents with filtration systems. 93 For the
latter, the analysis concluded that the quantitative costs ($15 to $20
million per reactor unit) outweighed the quantitative benefits. 94
Nevertheless, staff recommended that filtered vents be installed:
A comparison of only the quantifiable costs and benefits of the proposed
modifications, if considered safety enhancements, would not, by
themselves, demonstrate that the benefits exceed the associated costs.
However, when qualitative factors such as the importance of
containment systems within the NRC’s defense-in-depth philosophy are
considered, as is consistent with Commission direction, a decision to
require the installation of engineered filtered vent systems is
justified.95

The full document includes a backfit analysis. 96 Notably,
following industry complaints that costs of compliance would be too
high, members of Congress asked the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to investigate and report on NRC’s cost estimating
methods generally, and its 2012 filtered venting system estimate
specifically.97 GAO’s report, issued in 2014, concluded that the cost
estimate was “not reliable because it did not fully or substantially
meet any of the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate.” 98
Meanwhile, NRC issued a new Venting Order on June 6, 2013,
superseding the first, and modifying licenses to require that the
reliable hardened vents would not only help prevent core damage, but
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See generally R.W. BORCHARDT, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N,
SECY-12-0157, CONSIDERATION OF ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTAINMENT
VENTING SYSTEMS FOR BOILING WATER REACTORS WITH MARK I AND MARK II
CONTAINMENT STRUCTURES (Nov. 26, 2012) [hereinafter STAFF ADDITIONAL
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GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE [GAO], GAO-15-98, NRC NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS COST
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GAO REPORT].
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The industry expressed concern that costs would be much higher. GAO
REPORT, supra note 93, at 3.
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STAFF ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS, supra note 93, at 2.
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See id. at 8 (citing Backfit Guidance Document).
97.
GAO REPORT, supra note 93, at 3–4.
98.
Id. at 15.

also function after core damage has already occurred (that is, in
severe accident conditions). 99 Venting Order II incorporated the
adequate protection provisions of the first order, but it added the
post-core-damage protection as a cost-justified safety enhancement,
relying on other portions of the staff’s backfitting analysis. 100
Acknowledging that venting under such circumstances could lead to
release of radioactive materials, the agency also directed staff to
pursue filtered systems via the rulemaking process—apparently
backing away from the position espoused in the staff analysis
above.101
Thereafter, an industry working group under the Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) developed a guidance document for
implementing the modified order for NRC review. 102 NRC staff held
several public meetings, provided its own comments, and, after a few
revisions from NEI, issued a draft guidance document for public
comment.103 After a series of public meetings and further comments
(including from the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards), staff
issued a final guidance document for complying with the modified
order.104
This example—only one of the numerous activities responding to
Fukushima—provides a flavor of the many regulatory iterations
involved in reacting to a disaster. Although the NTTF Report issued
quickly following Fukushima, it took several years to develop
compliance criteria for the backfitting orders, and rulemakings are
still underway. Of interest, in March 2015, Senate Republicans issued
a letter to NRC requesting that the agency fold ongoing Fukushima
investigations into its existing workload. 105 In particular, the letter
cautioned NRC not to repeat post-Three Mile Island mistakes by
failing to subject proposed requirements to structured review, risk
prioritization, and cost-benefit analysis. It criticized the experience
with the venting orders (recall that initially, NRC staff recommended
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105.
Letter from Sen. Jim Inhoffe, U.S. S. Envtl. & Pub. Works Comm., to the
Hon. Stephen G. Burns, NRC (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.epw.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/press-releases-republican?ID=019C9287-BC15-25E6-AD618D6F2560A35A [http://perma.cc/T3SJ-9TV9] (archived Sept. 21, 2015).

requiring filters even though the quantitative costs outweighed the
benefits) and endorsed NRC’s ultimate decision to consider that issue
in a rulemaking proceeding: “[NRC’s] actions regarding external
filters is, once again, a stark reminder that disciplined regulatory and
cost benefit analysis provide a basis for distinguishing between
matters that are truly safety-significant and those that merely
appear so.”106
Throughout the Fukushima response, the level of engagement by
the regulated community is notable. Not only did that community
provide comments and attend meetings, but it also developed the
compliance criteria that NRC ultimately adopted. Moreover, the
congressional activity—from the GAO Report to the letter above—
reflected concerns that the regulatory response was perhaps
exceeding efficient levels, as the risk perception literature might have
predicted. The next section takes up retroactivity as a framing device
for such concerns.
IV. RETROACTIVITY AND PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Retroactivity
As demonstrated by the controversy regarding filtered vents,
backfitting requirements can impose significant costs on nuclear
operators by changing the legal framework and expectations within
which they are already operating. Such orders are adjudicatory in the
sense that they apply legal standards to a given set of facts, reaching
specified licensees.107 On the other hand, to the extent they also apply
generally and hold future effect, they operate like rules. 108 Regardless
of the characterization, the sort of retroactivity involved in the
Fukushima backfitting orders is almost certainly unproblematic.
By their nature, cases addressing retroactivity take up the issue
from the regulated entity’s point of view;; thus, courts frame the
“principle concerns” of retroactivity as “lack of notice and the degree
of reliance on former standards.” 109 The test of retroactivity for
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Id. It seems clear that the letter was motivated by concern that the
regulated industry bears too many unjustified costs. See id. (requesting information on
additional regulatory requirements that have been imposed over the last five years,
beyond backfits).
107.
See 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2015) (including licensing within the definition of
order).
108.
See id. § 551(4) (defining rule).
109.
Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n
[FERC], 826 F.2d 1074, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Mikva, J., dissenting) (quoting
Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 n.22 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).

adjudicative policymaking balances the retroactive effect “against the
mischief of producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design
or to legal and equitable principles.”110 For retroactive rulemaking,
we have already seen the critical distinction: rules that impose “new
sanctions on past conduct”111 must be expressly authorized,112 while
rules that only “upset expectations” are termed “secondarily
retroactive” and are subject to the arbitrary-and-capricious
standard. 113 The focus of an arbitrary-and-capricious review of
secondarily retroactive agency action is on balancing the benefits and
burdens of the action.114
The upshot is that the reason-giving requirement for
adjudicative retroactivity is similar to that for secondarily retroactive
rules: agencies must explain why the balancing of harms and benefits
favors retroactivity; the failure to consider prospective application
can be arbitrary and capricious. 115 These standards are not likely
problematic for backfitting because of the larger statutory framework.
First, the adequate protection standard expressly contemplates
license modifications, putting licensees on notice of secondary
retroactivity. As for adjudicatory retroactivity, the usual retroactivity
challenge arises from a procedural claim—that the agency should
have regulated by rule rather than by adjudication. But the premise
to this argument is that if the agency were to operate by rule, it
would apply its policy only prospectively (in contrast to the partial
retroactivity common to adjudication). NRC would likely fail to
comply with its statutory mandate if it chose to regulate only
prospectively after having determined that adequate protection
necessitated a particular practice or technology. And this is to say
nothing of the substantive balancing that a retroactivity analysis
would entail: even millions of dollars to the regulated industry is not
likely going to win against the public benefit of “adequate protection”
or even additional safety enhancements.
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Nat’l Petrochemicals & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, 630 F.3d 145, 159 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
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See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208–12 (1988).
113.
Id. at 219 (Scalia, J., concurring); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC,
567 F.3d 659, 670–71 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.
244, 269–70 (finding that, for statutes, retroactivity does not encompass the mere upset
of expectations that were based in prior law).
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See Nat’l Petrochemicals & Refiners Ass’n, 630 F.3d at 166 (noting agency
decided there was adequate lead time, obligated parties had received adequate notice,
and other approaches were problematic); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 567 F.3d at
670–71 (determining that the agency carefully balanced benefits and burdens of
applying rule to render certain existing contracts unenforceable).
115.
Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC, 826 F.2d 1074, 1094 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Mikva, J., dissenting); Yakima Valley Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC,
794 F.2d 737, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

B. Principles of Administrative Law and Stakeholder Engagement
For industry challenging a backfit, is there anything to be made
of the breadth of the statutory mandate? A nondelegation challenge is
almost certain to fail. 116 As for the agency’s substantive
interpretation of the mandate, some scholars have suggested that
agencies should set standards that limit their discretion, setting forth
principles, for example, that would guide their decision making in
particular cases.117 But it is not difficult to see why the backfit rule is
particularly hard to cabin with a forward-looking definition of
“adequate protection.” The mechanism has been invoked as a
response to events that by definition were not foreseen; they are not
part of the design basis for licensing ex ante.
Many scholars have argued that the best way to police agencies’
behavior is through the ex post oversight supplied by judicial review
and political checks.118 On the surface, one might conclude that the
backfit context makes judicial review all the more important because
backfitting offers less in the way of ex ante participation and
deliberation, at least compared to traditional rulemaking. Certainly
this objection seems to be at the heart of the congressional letter
above. Further, the traditional accounts of both secondary
retroactivity and dread risks emphasize the potential for agency
overreaching, enhance the importance of procedure in mitigating such
behavior, and rely on judicial review to incentivize agencies to
mitigate unfairness to regulated entities. 119
But there are countervailing considerations. The traditional
account of agency capture predicts that agencies will settle on
positions less responsive to the public interest because they receive
most of their information from the regulated industry and are
incentivized to avoid litigation with the groups that most likely
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See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 457–73 (2001)
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adjudications. Cf. United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 212–13 (1956)
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See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the “New”
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See, e.g., WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE &
PRACTICE 326 (5th ed. 2014) (suggesting agencies can avoid retroactivity problems like
those in Retail, Wholesale by issuing cease-and-desist orders rather than imposing
financial penalties).

threaten appeals.120 As Professor Wendy Wagner has observed, this is
of particular concern in highly technical, specialized areas of law,
where—even if regulators are opposed to skewed outcomes—the
issues “are so technical and complicated that in practice they take
place at an altitude that is out of the range of vision of the full set of
normally engaged and affected parties.” 121 Moreover, these concerns
are reinforced when courts review agency exercises of discretion in
light of a permissive statutory mandate in highly technical fields.
“Super deference,”122 which instructs that courts should be at their
“most deferential” when reviewing agency actions at the “frontiers of
science,”123 undermines accountability by glossing over the details of
agency reasoning.124
Consider again the particulars of the Fukushima response.
Certainly NRC responded quickly—as would be predicted by risk
theory and as appropriate given the high stakes. 125 Further, the
backfitting orders issued for adequate protection did not need costbenefit analyses, suggesting the potential for overreaching. It is, of
course, impossible here to ascertain whether overreaching actually
happened, but it is notable that no regulated entities used the
procedures for challenging the adequate-protection backfitting.126 On
the other hand, the regulated industry appears to have used other
means of influencing the results, as illustrated by the filtered vent
issue—raising concerns directly with NRC and perhaps bringing
congressional oversight to bear—with the result that NRC shifted
away from backfitting and toward rulemaking.
A brief look at the opportunities for stakeholder engagement is
also useful. One set of stakeholders, of course, is the regulated
industry itself, which has been very actively engaged in developing
applicable standards. Not only is this evident from NEI’s role in
drafting compliance standards, but it also is apparent from a brief
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review of the rosters of the public meetings NRC has held. 127 This is
not to suggest anything untoward; certainly the industry has some of
the best information about the options for, and feasibility of,
compliance. The participation of those directly regulated by NRC is
indeed necessary to the legitimacy of the regulatory exercise.
Still, one wonders where the other stakeholders are, particularly
given the special risk characteristics of nuclear power and the
sustained opposition to the industry that has existed for decades.
They did not challenge the backfitting orders, and it would have been
difficult to do so because of the technical showings that would be
required to intervene. The regulatory dockets show little public
interest group or community involvement in the “interactions with
stakeholders” referenced by NRC. Instead, such groups have focused
their efforts on petitions for rulemaking, 128 the courts,129 Congress, 130
and the media. 131 With respect to petitions for rulemaking, that
approach is notoriously unsuccessful. 132 The courts are difficult to
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predict; as noted above, there is strong line of super deference in
nuclear power decisions, but there are occasional examples of much
harder-look review.133 Congress has proven to be an effective forum
for major policy debates, as demonstrated by its involvement in
overseeing NRC’s cost-benefit analysis and certainly by its role in
inhibiting the progress of Yucca Mountain. 134 And of course, the
media actively participates in the nuclear policy debate.
But therein lies an important administrative law lesson of the
Fukushima response. Stakeholder debate is robust at the policy level,
but when it comes to actually formulating the technical and scientific
data, options, and standards, the field of nuclear power leans heavily
toward agency-industry dialogue. The industry-capture literature
relies strongly on administrative procedure to counteract the
potential ills of such a scenario, but as noted here, neither traditional
administrative procedure nor the ultimate promise of judicial review
offers meaningful checks. And with fewer stakeholder perspectives on
the science and technology of nuclear power and safety engaged in
actual decision making, the nuclear power discussion lurches toward
policy arguments and political stalemates. This speaks to a frequent
lament in regulatory policy more broadly—with administrative law as
“bloodsport” 135 and congressional gridlock becoming only deeper, 136
significant pressure is placed on agencies to do the best they can. 137
It is hard to prescribe a way for agencies to directly increase the
scope of technical expertise among interested parties. After all, it can
take an individual physicist or engineer years to develop expertise,
particularly the kind borne of direct experience with nuclear power or
materials. It is not to be expected that an interested observer of
nuclear safety would have the same kind of experience and access to
information. But perhaps one area for improvement lies in the
avenues for public-interest stakeholders to gain a seat at the table.
The risk perception literature predicts greater open-mindedness
about risks where parties perceive pluralistic discussion. 138 The
procedural justice literature also predicts greater acceptance of
ultimate decisions when participants are offered a voice, respect, and
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trustworthy and neutral decision makers.139 And the administrative
law literature predicts better decisions and improved legitimacy for
agencies that can enhance participation, deliberation, and
transparency.140
Can agencies find new ways to achieve these things? Certainly.
As Professor David Markell and I have documented, an agency can
further its “inside-out” 141 legitimacy by voluntarily engaging in
legitimizing
behavior,
notwithstanding
other
procedural
obligations. 142 A variety of informal mechanisms can promote such
behavior, even when statutory mandates otherwise prescribe certain
procedural requirements. Indeed, agency culture and professionalism
can spur innovations,143 and there is likely potential to leverage the
relationships developed at the regional and state level to better create
meaningful stakeholder engagement and, ultimately, results that
match the intent of the statutory mandate. 144 More research is
needed to identify ways to operationalize these general approaches,
as is a more meaningful commitment from agencies themselves to
improve in this regard. But the need for both—particularly in fields
where dread risks can manifest as disasters—is critical.
V. CONCLUSION
Disaster requires response—both on the ground and within our
legal systems. A nuclear disaster, moreover, invites fears about the
safety of the nuclear fleet worldwide. NRC’s quick approach to
identifying lessons learned from Fukushima illustrates how a
regulatory agency might structure disaster response in the face of
significant risk—and risk perception. This Article has applied an
administrative law lens to that response, considering issues of
fairness, retroactivity, agency capture, and stakeholder engagement.
While the regulated industry has worked very closely with NRC in
formulating new standards, the numerous technical barriers to
participation have shifted other stakeholders’ attention away from
the standard-setting process and into more policy-oriented venues.
This dynamic stands to further polarize public opinion at a time when
much is at stake for nuclear power. Emerging research suggests ways
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forward; this Article concludes with the hope that further work
toward stakeholder inclusion will only improve regulatory disaster
response in the future.

